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DE RUEHKH #2240/01 2571620
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141620Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4558
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002240

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND IO A/S SILVERBERG
DEPT ALSO FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY
USUN FOR E BRUNO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016

TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU US UN SU

SUBJECT: UN SRSYG PRONK BRIEFS DARFUR PARTNERS

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During a Sept. 14 briefing of Darfur Partners, UN SRSYG Pronk said little progress had been made on broadening support for the DPA, the Government is pressing military campaigns in North Darfur, the Ceasefire Commission does not work well, and the Sudanese Government remains unaltered in its rejection of a UN PKO. UN DSRSYG Taye described preparations underway for the Sept. 18 UNSC/AU P&SC meeting in New York and AU interest in extending AMIS to permit an eventual transition to a UN PKO. FM Lam Akol's visit to Washington was a lost opportunity, as it did not result in new options to address the Darfur conflict constructively. The SPLM continues to press for broader DPA acceptance, and is willing to host a conference to encourage non-signatories to come on board. The DPA needs to be made more attractive to broaden its base of support. Pronk's Plan A is to add incentives for Sudan to accept a UN PKO, such as easing sanctions and relieving debt; Plan B is to consider other options, including a Chapter VIII PKO. He urged participants to remain in consultation and to deliver a common message. End summary.

UN SRSYG Pronk: No Progress on UN PKO, Security Poor

¶2. (C) During a September 13 briefing of the Contact Group/Darfur Partners (UK, Canada, France, Norway, Netherlands, and U.S.), UN Special Representative Jan Pronk made the following points:

-- UNSG Annan had made a strong statement to the UNSC on Darfur, condemning ongoing violence and noting the deployment of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) there was in violation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and previous UNSCRs. The SG called on the partners of AMIS to continue supporting it in anticipation of an eventual UN peacekeeping operation (PKO); he noted that Sudan would be held accountable in the event consent is not given to a UN PKO and needless deaths occur for having failed in its responsibility to protect its own citizens;

-- while talks continue regarding broadening the DPA, no success has been reached yet, despite involvement of FVP Salva Kiir;

-- fighting continues in North Darfur, with the SAF launching new attacks on rebel-held villages. The SAF is using SLM leader Minni Minawi's troops in a back-up/support role. Many of Minni's rebels and new SAF recruits appear reluctant to fight. The Government maintains that it has a right to attack DPA non-signatories;

-- the National Redemption Front (NRF), including G-19 elements, appears to be pressing southward, and the quiet of South Darfur may be temporary;

-- while West Darfur does not have outright combat at present, it is hard-hit by banditry, with many areas designated "no go" areas by the UN;

-- although Ceasefire Commission (CFC) meetings are taking place, there is a backlog of 70-80 items, with only 15 or so items being brought to conclusion in each meeting. Many items are referred repeatedly to the CFC, and both the UN and the U.S. Observers have not been permitted to raise incidents for investigation by the African Union Chair. Strangely, the EU Observer has agreed with the AU's silencing of the UN and U.S. Observers. In conclusion, the CFC process does not work;

-- the AMIS Force Commander role is changing hands this week, with the incoming FC in Addis Ababa for consultations. The AU is preparing in Addis Ababa for the September 18 Peace and Security Council (P&SC) meeting with the UNSC in New York on September 18. UN Principal Deputy Sp. Rep Taye-Brook Zerihoun and AU P&SC Commission Said Djinnit will also hold a preparatory meeting; and

-- the Sudanese Government still has not accepted a transition to a UN PKO. A UN PKO "cannot be deployed without consent." President Bashir has consistently voiced his opposition, and few in Sudan are taking a stand in favor of a UN PKO. There are no hints of a u-turn by the Government, no statements that keep the door open, and no evidence of efforts to prepare the public for a change in its views. The

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current security situation is unacceptable; if AMIS withdraws from Darfur, the security situation will deteriorate further, rendering implementation of the DPA impossible.

AU P&SC Commission Djinnit Seeks AMIS Extension

¶3. (C) Taye stated that AU Special Representative Kingibe and he had met with acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Ali Karti, and probed regarding the Government's intentions. Preparations are underway for the September 18 meeting in New York, at which AU P&SC Commissioner will discuss a "lite package" to help AMIS continue in Darfur. The AU is reviewing resources available, and hopes to continue the effort one or two months. This, however, needs to be a priority of the international community. Djinnit says AMIS seeks to stay, and all measures need to be done to ensure that its mandate not be concluded. An extension, however, will be in the context of a transition to a UN PKO.

FM Lam Akol in Washington: A Missed Opportunity

¶4. (C) USAID Director and Pol/Econ Chief noted Minister of Foreign Affairs Lam Akol's visit to the Department of State on September 11 had not gone well, with Akol not able or willing to provide Secretary Rice with the hand-carried letter from President Bashir to President Bush. Secretary Rice advised Akol that a transition to a UN PKO in Darfur was necessary for improvement in bilateral relations, and that the Sudanese Government had not as of yet offered any indication of new thinking on the issue, but rather sought to push its own security plan for Darfur.

Norway: SPLM Views on Process

¶ 15. (C) The Norwegian ambassador discussed a recent meeting with SPLM National Assembly Chair Yassir Arman, wherein Yassir said the SPLM sought to get DPA non-signatories on common ground, including through hosting a conference in Yei.

Support for this effort included FVP Kiir and VP Taha, who have formed a high committee to press for broader acceptance of the DPA. Failure to implement the DPA is a cancer on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the ambassador added.

UK: DPA Needs to be Made Attractive, Not Pressure Point

¶ 16. (C) The British ambassador said that Minni Minawi had no power, and was not able to see either the president or vice president. Neither the SLM nor the SPLM carries much political clout, and the strategy of the national Congress Party (NCP) has been to bolster its hardline position. The NCP seeks to stay in power, and is afraid that introducing foreign troops will attract violent opposition by fundamentalists. The DPA has to be made attractive, he added, and not a pressure point. He questioned whether the DPA could not be re-opened to add value to it. The Sudanese Government is using the DPA to attack, and is not working to bring other parties on board. Arguments against the DPA center on two issues: the amount of compensation and janjaweed disarmament. Both needed to be addressed to broaden support for the DPA.

UN SRSYG Pronk Discussed Darfur Plans A and B

¶ 17. (C) Pronk mentioned that the international community should evaluate the possibilities of a Chapter VIII peacekeeping operation, wherein the UN would assign peacekeeping to a regional body, and would both direct it and finance it. The African Union force cannot do it, although a different AU deployment might be able to do so. Pronk noted that Presidential Advisor al-Khalifa had mentioned the concept to UN U/S Guehenno earlier.

¶ 18. (C) Pronk added that the process needed an outcome that is face saving, and in which the use of force is constrained. This would be Plan A, wherein possibly dropping sanctions, assisting with debt relief, and supporting AU presidency in the coming year for Sudan might sway the Government's views

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on a UN PKO. The international community should continue to outline the real purpose of a transition to a UN PKO, which would include implementing the DPA and strengthening the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Plan B, he said, would be to re-visit other concepts, such as a Chapter VIII PKO.

¶ 19. (C) In the absence of a transition to a UN PKO, Pronk concluded, AMIS must continue in its mandate to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. It is important for the international community to continue generating additional ideas and exchanging views on ways by which DPA support can be broadened. He also suggested participants continue to consult with their capitals to agree on common messages.

POWERS